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Introduction
The global #nancial crisis of 2008 initially seemed to mark the bankruptcy of neoliberal deregulation and a transition to a new era of renewed faith in government, yet the rising 
fortunes of parties on the right seem to belie this easy lesson. This essay considers the persistence 
of managed and relatively egalitarian capitalism after the crisis of #nance capitalism. I re!ect on 
why some societies are more equitable and solidaristic than others, question whether our beliefs 
about cross-national variation continue to hold true, and ponder how the #nancial crisis might 
a"ect nations’ capacities to construct coalitions for social solidarity.
The Social Determinants of an Egalitarian, Coordinated Society
Market inequality and dualism have increased substantially in the past few decades and one 
wonders why some countries are better able than others to sustain relative equality, redistribution 
and investment in the skills for low-skilled workers against postindustrial treats. In a series of articles 
and a book manuscript, Duane Swank and I re!ect on the possible role for employers in coalitions 
to sustain welfare state spending and skills investments. We di"er from much of the engaging 
work on class coalitions for equality by our peers, as we believe that employers are potentially 
important coalitions for programs for low-skilled workers and investigate the conditions under 
which employers take positions that further social solidarity.1 
We argue that the structure of associations shape employers’ preferences for social policies and 
that the state plays a major role in the creation and sustenance of these associations and in coalition 
building (see also work by Suzanne Berger, Wolfgang Streeck, and Peter Katzenstein). Corporatist 
associations have political-economic e"ects (in producing wage compression), collective action 
e"ects (in helping employers work jointly for collective social goods), and cognitive e"ects (in 
channeling information, creating identities, and shaping preferences.) These e"ects are especially 
important to investments in policies for marginal workers; for example, at a cross-national level, 
countries with high levels of macro-corporatism had the highest levels of spending on active labor 
market programs, and, at a micro-level, #rm membership in corporatist groups is a signi#cant 
determinant of #rm participation in active labor market programs. These associations also matter 
to redistribution and relative equality (Martin and Swank, APSR, 2004; Swank and Martin 2009). 
Much of our book concerns the emergence and maintenance of diverse types of associations: 
macro-corporatist groups found in Scandinavia, pluralist ones found in liberal countries, and 
ones with an intermediate level of sectoral coordination found in Germany and other continental 
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countries. At the dawn of the 20th century, employers’ peak 
associations were created to further industrialization and 
to control worker activism and rising democratization. 
Party leaders and bureaucrats, in fact, organized these peak 
employers’ associations to serve their own policy and electoral 
agendas and to #ght politicians representing agricultural 
interests. Consequently, the rules of political competition and 
structures of the state mattered greatly to the ultimate form of 
the groups. In countries with centralized, multiparty systems (as 
opposed to two-party systems), business-oriented politicians 
faced potential coalitions of farmers and workers and had 
incentives to cultivate the organization of their business allies 
to bolster electoral support against these political competitors. 
Because these politicians on the right viewed success in 
parliamentary channels as unlikely, they sought to delegate 
policy-making authority to peak organizations of employers 
and labor, thinking that business had a better chance of 
retaining control when negotiating with workers than when 
#ghting legislative battles against workers and farmers. Thus, 
corporatism was born, somewhat paradoxically, out of a desire 
to evade democratic controls, but the 
countries that were most successful in 
this evasion ended up becoming the most 
egalitarian by the end of the 20th century 
(Martin and Swank, APSR, 2008).
In the past quarter-century, dein-
dustrialization pressured the coordinating 
capacities of business and labor 
throughout the world. Yet convergence 
failed to occur, as some countries have 
been better able than others to resist 
neoliberal attacks on the welfare state 
and deregulation. Somewhat surprisingly, 
those countries with the highest level of 
coordination – where one might most 
expect the greatest departure from the 
old arrangements – have had the most success in sustaining 
social pacts among business, labor and the state. We suggest 
that the same features of government that shaped the 
emergence of corporatist systems – party system features and 
the centralization of government – have sustained high levels of 
coordination and attention to the skills needs of even marginal 
workers against challenges posed by deindustrialization. In part, 
this is because political leaders in these multi-party coalition 
governments still need their private-sector constituency 
groups to bolster their party’s political power against other 
political parties.
Proportional representation and centralization have also 
been associated with the growth of the public sector, and 
countries with large public sectors have greater incentive to 
enhance the skills of low skilled workers, many of whom end up 
working within government. Faced with #scal austerity, public 
bureaucrats turn to the social partners to help share in the 
pain of managing economic transition. The associations loathe 
losing their policymaking authority and tend to participate in 
these state campaigns to stay in charge. Thus a representative 
of a Danish peak association told me that “business and labor 
are like Siamese twins” in seeking to preserve their jurisdictional 
authority against the state.
The New Logic of Post-Finance Capitalism
The essential question is whether this logic will hold in 
the wake of the #nancial crisis. Coordination sustained social 
solidarity (and certain features of government shored up 
coordination) during the recent period of globalization and 
deindustrialization, but what happens when the neoliberal 
attacks end and when the end of these attacks is accompanied 
by de-globalization and the collapse of major service sectors (in 
particular #nance and retail)? Will the havens of security gain 
the upper hand, or will the coordinating capacities of egalitarian 
countries be scaled back? Will the #nancial crisis threaten our 
expectations about the impact of coordination on public policy 
and will it have implications for social science theory?
First, the #nancial crisis seems to have had an impact on 
conceptions of appropriate coordination, regulation and big 
government. Many celebrated the death 
knoll to deregulation and neoliberalism 
in the wake of the downturn, and this 
might ease states’ capacity to embrace 
coordination and big government. Thus in 
the Warwick Commission, Len Seabrook, 
Mark Blythe and others observed a greater 
need for systemic regulation, because 
monitoring individual #nancial instruments 
was insu$cient. The Obama victory gave 
a sense of excitement on the left that 
progressive ideas would gain salience in 
political circles. Newsweek – hardly a radical 
rag – declared that “Big Government Is Back 
– Big Time” (2/16/09). Yet, the ideological 
legacy of #nance capitalism has been rather 
mixed. Fred Block points out that recent trends in the US have been 
toward “reregulation” rather than “deregulation,” because altering 
regulations allowed #rms to renege on worker commitments and 
create new risky derivatives markets. Moreover, the public has 
short-term memory, while parties in charge at the crisis point – 
think New Labour – have lost their bearing.
Second, the #nancial crisis has had mixed economic implications 
for egalitarian capitalism and the #scal slack that enables collective 
action toward shared social ends. On the one hand, there has been 
a huge rise in use of expansionary #scal policies and government 
stimulus programs in wake of the crisis and a seeming break with 
the monetarist policies of Thatcher and Reagan. In a moment 
reminiscent of Nixon’s famous declaration “We are all Keynesians 
now,” Sarkozy remarked, “Am I a socialist? Perhaps.”
Yet, deregulation was not the only legacy of #nance capitalism. 
Despite lip service to supply-side economics, economic growth 
in the past decades has been stimulated by consumer-debt-
driven demand. If failure is blamed on debt-driven consumption 
rather than on deregulation, the resurgence of big government 
is in trouble. As Johannes Lindvall points out, there has been 
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a decoupling of economic policy from other policymaking 
realms and macroeconomic stabilization policies with strong 
commitments to enhancing employment are unlikely to emerge 
with this crisis as they did during the Great Depression.
Moreover, while the failures of #nance capitalism may 
undercut neoliberal ideology, they also undercut social 
investments. Bubble economies created #scal slack for social 
solidarity and high rates of employment created a labor market 
need for the low skilled workers, but the #nancial woes have 
both reduced economic slack and increased unemployment. 
Thus a year after the crisis, the Economist (9/26/2009, 29-32) 
announced that “a leaner and #tter state should emerge” from 
the crisis, and recommended various forms of “liposuction” to 
cut away the fat.
In addition, the economic crisis may threaten international 
economic relations, with the rise of economic nationalism and 
trade protectionism (Financial Times 9/14/2009). Coordinated 
winners may sustain coordinated capitalism at home, but handle 
the crisis by “beggaring their debtors” in less developed countries. 
Before the crisis, coordinated countries were like college 
undergraduates on spring break in Eastern Europe, encouraging 
risky #nancial ventures with low-interest loans. After the crisis, the 
major Latvian bank had to be nationalized, the housing bubble 
burst, and the country’s credit rating was downgraded to junk 
status (Economist 2/28/09, 27). Thus, even if coordinated countries 
survive, there may be a dangerous drying up of credit across 
borders and resurgence of economic nationalism. 
Third, the #nancial crisis seems to con#rm our beliefs 
about the institutional bene#ts of coordinated capitalism and 
a large, vibrant state: coordinated countries with high levels of 
macrocorporatism, infrastructure-bolstering social investments, 
and large states are best surviving the storm. The Danish bailout 
plan won high praise from the EU (Outlook 3/12/09), and the 
Lausanne’s Institute for Management Development ranked 
Denmark number one in responding to the #nancial crisis 
(Financial Times 2/25/09). Firms in coordinated countries also 
seem to recognize the bene#ts of coordination during these 
troubled times; thus, the Danish Ministry of Foreign A"airs 
declared the crisis good for Danish energy companies because 
cooperation improved #rms’ competitive positions (“Financial 
Crisis is Good for the Danish Energy Companies, 10/28/08).” 
Liberal countries are learning rather di"erent lessons from the 
crisis, moving to cut spending to the bone. Thus our theories 
about continuing divergence are likely to withstand this new 
critical juncture.
Yet, at this moment of transition, a big question about the 
persistence of social solidarity concerns solidarity for whom? 
Are we only concerned about the insular countries of Western 
Europe, or should we worry about a broader cross-section of 
humanity? Perhaps the #nancial crisis reinforces our beliefs 
about the bene#ts of coordination and a strong state, but one 
wonders what will be the impact of the end of #nance capitalism 
on the truly disadvantaged. 
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